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9:&IQQRF&B4:S4!4:&S!9BA:4 coined the term “cartographic anxiety” to describe 
a persistent neurosis that seemed to mark Indian practices of state and nation 
building.! To anyone who had occasion to open an atlas in India in the ! rst 
half-century of its postcolonial existence, this neurosis would have been evident 
in the rubber stamp that Customs Department o"  cials doggedly impressed upon 
the pages of any foreign publication that dared to represent the e# ective boundaries 
between India and its neighbours, Pakistan and China, rather than those the 
Indian state claimed for itself. The stamp read, “The external boundaries of 
India as depicted are neither accurate nor authentic.” For Krishna, the term 
“cartography” encompasses all those representational practices that, in various 
ways, have attempted to inscribe something called ‘India’ and to endow that 
entity with content, history, meaning, and purpose, taking within its ambit not 
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only the drawing of lines on a map but also the frequently bloody and coercive 
processes by which those lines are socially produced and made e! ective.8 Krishna 
understands India’s cartographic anxiety as stemming both from the peculiar 
circumstances of its birth—its creation-by-amputation in the bloody events of 
Partition—but also as “a facet of a larger postcolonial anxiety: of a society suspended 
forever in the space between the ‘former colony’ and ‘not-yet-nation.’”7 It is this 
state of suspension, he argues, that fuels the obsession on the part of the 
postcolony to approximate a historical origin that never existed, except as 
the telos of the narrative of modernity: “[P]ostcoloniality may be de" ned as a 
condition marked by the perpetual e! ort of colonized societies to catch up with 
the putative pasts and presents of colonizing societies who anyway do not accept 
that they are in a race.”9  
Nearly two decades after this still widely cited article was written, the state of 
suspension that Krishna describes may seem unrecognizable to the casual reader. 
Analyses of India as a “rising power” wax eloquently about its military strength, 
its status as the largest arms importer in the world, its possession of nuclear 
weapons—now accorded US approval,( its position as the third-largest economy 
in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms$# with a growth rate that is projected to 
remain robust relative to those of developed economies even in a time of global 
recession,$$ and the endurance of its democratic institutions. More sober analyses 
point to the daunting challenges with which India grapples on a daily basis: a 
growing gap between rich and poor, larger absolute numbers of poor than in all 
of sub-Saharan Africa,$" left-wing violence from the Maoist Naxalite movement, 
the ever-present threat (and sporadically realized actuality) of religious fundamentalism 
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and communal violence, systemic corruption and infrastructural bottlenecks that 
threaten to impede growth, unresolved secessionist struggles in Kashmir and the 
Northeast, tensions with Pakistan and China, and the instability created by the 
Afghan war in South Asia more generally. Yet, whichever ‘India’ analysts choose to see, 
as Ramachandra Guha—one of the country’s foremost public intellectuals—notes, 
the question that typically animates them is not whether India will survive but 
whether it will become a superpower.,- ! e India of today continues to remain 
forever suspended, but the possibilities between which it dangles are less those 
of “former colony and not-yet-nation” than “troubled nation and great power.” 
Indeed, this image of perpetual suspension is corroborated by the portrayal of 
India as “always emerging but never quite arriving.”,. 
At the heart of the three books reviewed here is the notion of citizenship—
a paradigmatic cartographic practice demarcating insiders from outsiders and 
de" ning the membership of the body politic. Delineating changing trends in 
understandings and practices of citizenship over the life of the republic, all three 
books allow us to revisit the question of cartographic anxiety, to consider the 
forms in which it manifests itself, and ultimately to pose the question of whether 
greater power alleviates cartographic anxiety. Indeed, this is itself simply a refor-
mulation of the enduring question in international relations of whether greater 
power brings greater security. 
Anupama Roy’s book, Mapping Citizenship in India, might be read as a 
biography of ! e Citizenship Act, 1955,,* as the author investigates the politics 
surrounding its inception before exploring the debates that attended key amendments 
in 1986, 2003, and 2005. Although Roy sets out to mark moments of both 
inclusion and exclusion in the trajectory of Indian citizenship, the book in fact 
tells a story that is overwhelmingly weighted in favour of the latter. One sees here 
a notion of citizenship, originally moored in the idea of jus soli whereby rights 
of citizenship follow from birth within the territory of the state, becoming 
increasingly informed by the doctrine of jus sanguinis whereby citizenship follows 
from blood ties and descent. ! is change is starkly evident in the rules governing 
citizenship by birth, which, at the commencement of the Citizenship Act in 1955, 
accorded citizenship to virtually everyone born within the territory of India (with 
13. Ramachandra Guha, “Will India Become a Superpower?” in Nicholas Kitchen, ed, India: ! e 
Next Superpower? (London: LSE Ideas, 2012) at 6-16.  
14. Subrata K Mitra, “! e reluctant hegemon: India’s self-perception and the South Asian 
strategic environment” (2003) 12 Contemporary South Asia 399 at 400-01. 
15. No 57 of 1955, India Code [Citizenship Act].
!"#$"%&'(&)*+)),-&./00&0/1&2)345/0678
some exceptions)$9 but have subsequently become more restrictive. In addition to 
birth within the territory of the state, the 1986 amendment required that at least 
one parent be a citizen of India.$7 ! e 2003 amendment conferred citizenship by 
birth only where both parents were citizens or where one parent was a citizen and 
the other not an illegal migrant at the time of the child’s birth,$8 o" ering a clear 
indication of the jealousy with which the Indian state guards privileges of citizenship 
and the nature of the anxiety underpinning it.$(
Ethno-cultural practices and understandings of citizenship have been 
signi# cant from the inception of the citizenship regime. Roy describes a liminal 
period between the coming into force of the Constitution of India (Constitution)"# 
in 1950 and the promulgation of the Citizenship Act in 1955 when governmental 
authorities in both India and Pakistan had to deal with and assess the citizenship 
claims of a range of people crossing the new border: children, prisoners, and most 
extraordinarily, women who had been abducted in the course of Partition-related 
violence and had found themselves in the ‘wrong’ country. ! e exchange of these 
women, frequently carried out with no regard to their stated wishes, was considered 
a task essential to the consummation of both nations because of its unstated 
contribution to the restoration of izzat, or male honour."$ Decisions about the 
claims of these liminal subjects were informed by a range of considerations, 
including the nature and direction of movement, the intention with which it was 
imbued, and—crucially—the identity of the migrant. In an historical context 
still dominated by the memory of the brutality of Partition, Roy argues that 
judgments about loyalty—frequently derived from religion—were the primary 
basis for executive discretion, exception, and arbitrariness, even where the letter 
of the law permitted admission into citizenship."" 
Rather than eroding the ethno-cultural substrate of cartographic anxiety, the 
passage of time seems only to have furnished updated justi# cations for it in the 
context of a post-September 11 (“9/11”) world. Nor is such anxiety the preserve 
of the majoritarian institutions of government—the executive and legislature—
which might be expected to re$ ect social chauvinisms and neuroses. Among the 
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most interesting sections of Roy’s book are those that detail battles over citizenship 
in two of India’s northeastern states, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh, of which the 
former is particularly illustrative of these dynamics. When an ethnic Assamese 
movement began protesting the entry of ‘illegal aliens’ from Bangladesh in the 
1980s, the Congress government at the Union (i.e., federal) level, wary of yet 
another regional challenge to its dominance, sought to delegitimize the movement 
in a variety of ways, including by portraying these anxieties as speci! cally 
Assamese and not national. Among other things, the Union government passed 
the Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Act, 1983 (IMDT Act), a 
piece of legislation that made the process of identifying illegal migrants more 
onerous by shifting the burden of proving illegality on to the person alleging it-. 
(thereby modifying the existing procedure for identi! cation and deportation of 
illegal aliens speci! ed by ! e Foreigners Act, 1946, which required the alleged 
illegal alien to prove his or her legality).-/ In doing so, the Union government 
sought both to assert its exclusive prerogative to legislate on issues of citizenship 
and to wrest the moral high ground from the Assamese movement by posing as 
the guardian of immigrants’ human rights. " e constitutionality of the IMDT 
Act was challenged by the Assamese politician Sarbananda Sonowal, who argued 
that it discriminated against Assamese citizens by specifying distinct procedures 
for dealing with immigration into the state, thus making it impossible for them 
to detect and to deport foreigners from their soil. Among the numerous a#  davits 
! led by various interested parties was one by the National Democratic Alliance 
(NDA), led by the Hindu right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which dwelt 
at length on the dangers that illegal immigration of Muslims from Bangladesh 
posed to national security. In defending the constitutionality of the Act, the 
Congress asserted that it had the e$ ect of protecting Indian citizens from the 
harassment of opportunistic allegations of illegality.-* 
In 2005, the Supreme Court declared the IMDT Act unconstitutional on 
grounds that its exceptional application to Assam was discriminatory and took 
issue with shifting the onus of proof onto the authority charged with detection 
and deportation of foreigners.-0 " e Court shifted the burden of proof back on 
to the suspect—a move that had the e$ ect of undermining the presumption of 
innocence. " e Court justi! ed this legal regime of suspicion on the grounds of 
23. No 39 of 1983, India code, c 2 s 8 [IMDT Act], as repealed by the Supreme Court of India 
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restoring state sovereignty, which it claimed was diminished by the IMDT Act’s 
e! ective deprivation of the Union government’s capacity to expel foreigners who 
violated the Citizenship Act. It also spoke of restoring to the Union government 
its constitutional duty of protecting the state from external aggression—an 
observation that e! ectively construed immigration from Bangladesh as not merely 
illegal but as an act of aggression. As Roy notes, in the court’s exposition, “the 
constituent outsider was marked not only on account of being a foreigner, but 
also on account of being a Muslim, the latter inevitably associated with Islamic 
fundamentalism, as well as a threat to the nation (read Hindu) and its security.”"8 
Although Roy does not mention it, this ruling was not the " rst time that an 
agency of the Government of India had construed migration from Bangladesh as 
aggression. In the entirely di! erent context of the 1971 war with what was then 
East Pakistan, India’s ambassador to the United Nations, seeking to justify its 
use of force against Pakistan, initially drew attention to the plight of the citizens 
of East Pakistan, ten million of whom had # ed across the border into India."7 
Finding insu$  cient diplomatic support for this proto-humanitarian intervention 
argument—made in the context of the Cold War when there was little, if any, 
support for the notion that force could be used in defence of the human rights of 
the citizens of another state—the ambassador quickly changed his position to the 
more conventional one of self-defence against the wave of “refugee aggression” 
confronting his country."( Even as it sought to present itself as the liberator of the 
new state of Bangladesh, India has construed the people of that state as aggressors 
from the moment of Bangladesh’s inception. If the argument was " rst made for 
legalistic reasons, it has taken on more substantive and sinister connotations in 
the post-9/11 conjuncture, informed as it is by panics concerning terrorism and 
Islamist fundamentalism.
As should be evident by now, Indian discourses of citizenship have been 
haunted by the " gure of the  migrant whose relationship to the citizen is, in Roy’s 
view, not so much one of exclusion or opposition as “foreclusion”—a situation in 
which the outsider is presented discursively and constitutively in delineations of cit-
izenship.9# % e outsider is a constant referent, indispensable for the identi" cation of, 
and inextricably tied to, the citizen without fully being able to reproduce herself 
27. Roy, supra note 2 at 116. 
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as one.-, But the migrant is a multivalent ! gure, and there is at least one kind of 
migrant who appears to have been admitted into citizenship in a rare expansion of 
Indian conceptions of national belonging:  Persons of Indian Origin (PIO) abroad 
who are granted Overseas Citizenship of India (OCI). " e puzzle of how and why 
this happened is the subject of Latha Varadarajan’s book, ! e Domestic Abroad. 
Beginning in the year 2000, successive Union governments have taken steps 
to institutionalize the relationship between the Indian state and its diaspora—
a phenomenon that Varadarajan describes as the production of a “domestic 
abroad.” In 2003, on the initiative of the NDA government, Parliament passed 
! e Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2003, which conferred overseas Indian citizenship 
on PIOs from sixteen countries in North America, Europe, and Australasia-. (the 
choice of these countries led cynical observers to characterize the initiative as an 
exercise in cultivating “dollar and pound citizenship”--). With the exception of 
the right to participate in electoral politics, PIOs were granted a range of rights 
(visa-free travel, residence, investment, and land and property acquisition) that 
had previously been available only to resident and non-resident Indian (NRI) 
citizens.-/ " e following year, the new Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) 
government established a Ministry of Overseas Indian A# airs, and in 2005 the Citi-
zenship Act was amended to extend overseas citizenship to all PIOs who either had 
been or were eligible to become Indian citizens “at the commencement of the India 
constitution,” so long as their host countries permitted dual citizenship.-* " is refer-
ence to the Constitution implies that citizens of Pakistan and what is now Bangladesh 
are not eligible for overseas Indian citizenship, thereby reinscribing the cartographic 
anxiety that has, as we have seen, marked Indian citizenship since its inception.
" e state’s acute interest in the diaspora at this conjuncture was a novel and 
unprecedented development, incongruous with its relative disinterest in overseas 
Indians for much of its postcolonial history. Indeed, in the ! rst few decades after 
independence, the state oscillated between benign neglect and outright suspicion 
of Indians who settled abroad, refusing to champion their interests when their 
presence was resented by majority communities in their host countries. " is attitude 
seems to have stemmed from core principles of Nehruvian foreign policy: a ! erce 
commitment to mutual respect of sovereignty and territorial integrity—especially 
31. Ibid at 3-4.
32. Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2003, supra note 18 at s 2(1)(ee)(i)-(ii), (gg), Schedule IV.
33. C Rammanohar Reddy, “Citizenship with dollars and pounds,” ! e Hindu (19 January 
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35. Varadarajan, supra note 3 at 138; ! e Citizenship (Amendment) Bill!"2005, No 75 of 2005, 
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where other postcolonial states were concerned—coupled with a keenness to 
assuage regional concerns about Indian dominance. In practice, this meant that 
the government would not intervene to defend the interests of Indians in what 
were then Ceylon and Burma. ! e anti-imperialist commitments of Nehruvian 
foreign policy left the government rather unsympathetic to the plight of Indians 
adversely a" ected by the policies of postcolonial East African states. While condemning 
the most severe instances of persecution, such as Idi Amin’s expulsion of Ugandan 
Asians, the government of India generally held the view that overseas Indians 
had brought this state of a" airs upon themselves through their history of imperial 
collaboration and failure to make common cause with Africans in their host 
countries (this latter view was a polite way of referencing the racist and exploitative 
ways in which Indian communities tended to relate to black Africans).89 
In explaining the dramatic reversal of the state’s attitude towards the overseas 
Indian, Varadarajan’s central argument is that the neoliberal restructuring of the 
Indian state—a process that began in the 1980s—necessitated and made possible 
the diasporic reimagining of the nation.8: At the core of the author’s thesis is an 
argument about the strategies deployed by the Indian bourgeoisie to construct 
and maintain hegemony, an endeavour that entails representing their particular 
interests as coincident with those of the nation. In the years immediately 
preceding independence, the dominant faction of the Indian bourgeoisie 
sought to accomplish this by dissociating themselves from the departing 
colonial authorities and making common cause with the Congress right-wing. 
As articulated by leading industrialists such as G. D. Birla and Purshotamdas 
! akurdas, this position of enlightened self-interest maintained that the threat of 
communism was best averted by attacking the conditions of poverty in which it 
tended to take root.87 ! is led the capitalist writers of the 1945 “Bombay Plan” 
to endorse many elements of Nehruvian socialism, particularly the notion of 
a strongly interventionist state that would abolish feudalism, liquidate rural 
indebtedness, and, more generally, occupy the commanding heights of the 
economy in the interests of propelling India’s industrial development and 
reducing its dependence on foreign capital. ! is understanding of bourgeois 
interests also led Indian capitalists to endorse the nationalization of banks and in-
surance companies as well as the establishment of state # nancial institutions that 
would fund indigenous industrial production. For three-and-a-half decades 
after independence, a relatively stable compact between the state and the bour-
36. Ibid at 75-77.
37. Ibid at 17.
38. Varadarajan, supra note 3, at 83.
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geoisie prevailed in which the state would ! nance companies and protect them 
from foreign competition without interfering in their management.,-
As economic performance began to stagnate in the 1950s, mired in what 
was notoriously described by economists as the “Hindu rate of growth,” the ! rst 
cracks in this compact became evident. Successive foreign exchange crises forced 
the government to approach the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for bailouts. 
Mindful of the experience of the 1960s—when IMF conditionality had aroused 
domestic opposition across the entire political spectrum, making the required 
reforms impossible to implement and resulting in a loss of credibility in international 
! nancial markets—the government adopted a very di" erent approach in the 
1980s. It launched a pre-emptive structural adjustment program even before 
approaching the IMF for a loan, presenting this as something it had done of its 
own volition and rather than under IMF pressure. One element of the program 
was the NRI Portfolio Investment Scheme introduced in the 1982 budget, which 
permitted investment in the shares of companies registered in Indian stock exchanges 
by “non-residents of Indian nationality or origin,” as well as by corporations 
that were at least 60 per cent owned by such individuals../ # is scheme assumes 
particular importance in understanding the neoliberal restructuring of the state 
because it is clear, in retrospect, that it was the ! rst sign of the liberalization of 
Indian capital markets. # e government justi! ed the scheme on grounds that 
it would give Indian companies access to a valuable source of capital, implicitly 
acknowledging that the project of an aspiring autonomous national bourgeoisie 
had failed. # e opposition agreed with the diagnosis but not with the cure, 
arguing that opening the door to foreign investment would undermine national 
sovereignty and would potentially allow multinational corporations to take over 
Indian ! rms through the agency of NRIs. In her astute analysis of the legislative 
debates attending this controversy, Varadarajan demonstrates how the government 
sought to allay the sovereignty concerns (read: cartographic anxiety) of the 
opposition by constructing the NRI or the PIO as viable alternative sources of 
much-needed capital that were preferable to the IMF..0 In other words, playing 
up the “Indianness” of the NRI/PIO allowed the government to present this 
neoliberal restructuring as a case of the state reaching out to the nation abroad 
rather than as an abject surrender to foreign capital. 
Many of these arguments were reprised in the discussion around the 1991 
budget, which tends to be remembered as heralding a more radical round of neoliberal 
39. Ibid at 88.
40. Ibid at 94.
41. Ibid!at100.
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restructuring that sought to downsize the state and invite greater foreign 
investment. By this time, the bourgeoisie itself was split between a faction 
comprising older, more traditional ! rms that had been dependent on, and continued to 
desire, state protection from foreign competition, and a newly dominant faction 
run by professionals and entrepreneurs in the technologically advanced sectors 
of the economy who favoured faster and deeper liberalization. Having broken 
with the foundational compact between the state and the old bourgeoisie, this 
new faction faced the challenge of constructing a new hegemony that would link 
further liberalization with the national interest. As Varadarajan explains: 
If economic liberalization was not to be seen as an instrumental and calculated 
attempt by factions of the bourgeoisie to maintain and perpetuate their privileged 
status, if it was to be sustainable over a longer period of time, then what was needed 
was a way to make it seem like an essential step in the path of national progress … 
what was needed was a subject who could plausibly embody national aspirations, the 
potential for India to succeed in the global economy.'" 
It is in this context that the hailing of the diaspora and the valorization of the ! gure 
of the Indian abroad assume particular importance. " e success of the Indian 
abroad was invoked to demonstrate what Indians were capable of when liberated 
from the sti# ing requirements of bureaucratic red tape (such as the now-vili! ed 
Nehruvian “license-permit raj”'8). Moreover, homing in on the very apprehen-
sions that underpin cartographic anxiety, proponents of liberalization argued 
that protectionism re# ected an inferiority complex that was no longer warranted. 
India had reached a stage of development where it could welcome, rather than 
fear, foreign investment: " e success of the Indian abroad was ample proof, this 
new bourgeoisie insisted, that Indians were second to none on the world stage.'' 
If the 1991 budget inaugurated a rhetorical blurring of the distinction between 
NRIs and PIOs, the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2003 institutionalized it by 
granting the latter virtually all of the rights that the former had held by virtue 
of their continued possession of Indian citizenship while living abroad. " is 
amalgamation of statuses into a category de! ned only by ethno-cultural markers 
reinforces the general trend towards citizenship based on blood and descent that 
Roy chronicles so insightfully. Together with the continued exclusion of PIOs in 
Pakistan and Bangladesh from the possibility of overseas Indian citizenship, the 
42. Ibid!at 110. 
43. " e phrase refers to the elaborate regime of licenses and permits that governed the 
establishment and regulation of business in post-independence India till the advent of 
economic liberalization in the early 1990s.
44. Varadarajan, supra note 3 at 128.
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hailing of the diaspora, while purporting to allay the cartographic anxieties that 
expressed themselves in response to the impending entry of foreign capital, has 
in e! ect re-inscribed them. Considering that the Indian state now accords greater 
rights to a PIO who might never have set foot in the country than, say, a Bangladeshi 
migrant who has lived and worked in it for several decades, it is tempting to draw 
parallels with the Zionist project, wedded to a deterritorialized conception of its 
ethnos and less concerned with existing for all the people living within it. 
Varadarajan’s book will also appeal to readers with no particular interest in India 
insofar as it makes a number of interesting arguments about the place of diasporas in 
contemporary international relations. In particular, many will " nd it a convincing riposte 
to some of the more facile celebrations of diasporas as harbingers of a postnational 
consciousness.,* Varadarajan’s account of the diaspora as a “domestic abroad” 
reveals it to be a form of transnationalism produced through state policies and 
initiatives rather than simply a formation that challenges state and national 
identities. Yet the flip side of this emphasis on state production is that the 
diaspora itself remains rather voiceless in her narrative. With the exception of 
Swraj Paul, the British businessman whose acquisition of shares in Indian companies 
provoked the legislative debates over the NRI Portfolio Investment Scheme, we 
have very little sense of how the diaspora responded to being hailed by the state 
or whether it did any hailing of its own.  
In a methodological sense, Rochana Bajpai is determined not to write the 
sort of book that Varadarajan has. If Varadarajan tends to account for political 
rhetoric in terms of the social interests that it furthers, Bajpai insists that there is 
value in separating an analysis of the form of political rhetoric from an exposition 
of the functions that it performs. She suggests that abstracting from the historical 
context of political rhetoric and bracketing-o!  questions of function will give us 
a more accurate grasp of the intricacies of form, a more nuanced view of change, 
and ultimately a better understanding of political power. If ideologies attempt 
to " x the meanings of concepts, then analyzing the success or failure of attempts 
to change those meanings can tell us something about the construction and 
breakdown of political hegemony.,- In this sense, Bajpai, like Varadarajan, wants 
to discuss the question of hegemony, only less comprehensively and in greater 
depth. She is candid in acknowledging that she is only interested in part of a 
story that is worth telling—ideas by themselves do not explain outcomes—but 
nonetheless insists that there is value in providing a conceptual and ideological, 
45. Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1996) at 21.
46. Bajpai, supra note 1 at 14.
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as distinguished from an institutional or sociological, account of political 
hegemony.'9 ! e emphasis on the political isolates questions about the social 
relations of power. Bajpai does not doubt the importance of such inquiries, but 
chooses not to take them on in this particular work. ! is narrowed scope gives 
Debating Di! erence an exhaustiveness and depth that will likely make it the 
de" nitive work on its chosen topic.
Although I have been discussing citizenship as a paradigmatic cartographic 
practice dividing insiders from outsiders, insiders are themselves di# erentiated 
along myriad axes based on material inequality and social distinctions. In this 
sense, citizenship might be seen as throwing a " ctive cloak of equality over 
di# erently situated agents, yet these very di# erences can make the promise of 
citizenship less accessible to some than others. It is in this context that 
practices of di# erentiated citizenship have arisen, in which members of particular 
religious, racial, ethnic, linguistic, and other groups are incorporated into citizenship 
not only as individuals, but also on the basis of their group membership.'7 In her 
account of the origins and subsequent trajectories of group rights in India, Bajpai argues 
that the discourse on group rights has been conducted in a legitimating vocabulary, 
comprising a set of interlinked political concepts: secularism, democracy, social 
justice, national unity, and development. ! e evolution of this discourse is best 
understood in terms of changes in the inter-linkage and relative priority of these 
concepts in relation to one another.'( Bajpai’s narrative is structured around 
two historical periods: the late 1940s (the time of the drafting of the Indian 
Constitution), which she identi" es as a moment of group rights containment; and 
the late 1980s, when the constitutional resolution of group rights was challenged 
and renegotiated.
! ree developments are striking about the constitutional resolution of 
group rights: " rst, the abolition of colonial-era political safeguards for religious 
minorities; second, the provision of religious, cultural, and educational rights for 
such minorities; and third, the granting of political safeguards for the so-called 
Untouchable or Scheduled Caste groups.6# In an argument that alerts us to the 
powerful hold of cartographic anxiety and its ubiquity in the early years of 
independence, Bajpai maintains that the drafters of the Constitution took a dim 
view of political safeguards for religious minorities (such as the regime of 
separate electorates that had been implemented by the British colonial authorities) 
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because of the primacy of national unity in the legitimating vocabulary of 
the time.*- This unity was thought to have been fractured by the colonial 
government’s recognition of religious di! erences—a move attributed to the colonizer’s 
desire to keep the colonized divided and which ultimately culminated in Partition. 
" e primacy of national unity in the legitimating vocabulary meant that all the 
other concepts were construed in ways conducive to the putative requirements of 
such unity. " us, secularism was understood as the non-recognition of religious 
di! erences in political life; justice as the identical treatment of all individuals; 
development as the prioritization of the modern idea of nationhood over 
atavistic identities of religion, caste, and tribe; and democracy as rendering the 
social identity of representatives irrelevant. Religious, cultural, and educational 
rights for religious minorities survived the test of national unity in the course 
of these debates because the particular conception of secularism favoured at the 
time allowed for the recognition of religious identities in a private individual and 
associational capacity, even if not in the political sphere. " ese were construed as 
rights that would be exercised by religious minorities on their own initiative with 
no entitlement to state support.*. 
In contrast, political safeguards were endorsed for the Scheduled Castes 
because they were seen as mechanisms to diminish disadvantage and di! erence 
rather than maintaining distinctiveness.*/ It was argued that a#  rmative action 
for the so-called backward castes would further the cause of national unity: 
" e levelling of vertical disparities, it was suggested, would better realize 
the horizontal camaraderie of equal citizenship. One of the key arguments that 
Bajpai makes in this part of the book is that the legitimation of a#  rmative action 
for “backward castes” in terms that were consonant with—and indeed vital for—
the requirements of national unity left such provisions on a more secure political 
footing than religious, cultural, and educational rights for religious minorities, 
which, although guaranteed as fundamental rights to all citizens, nonetheless car-
ried an aura of majority largesse and have been vulnerable to right-wing Hindu 
accusation of minority appeasement ever since.*0 " e premises and argumentative 
pathways by which concepts are legitimated thus have enduring consequences for 
their political survival.   
" e debate over group rights for religious minorities was reopened in 
the 1980s in reaction to a controversial Supreme Court ruling in the case of 
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Mohammed Ahmed Khan v Shah Bano.66 One of the legacies of the constitutional 
settlement of group rights for religious minorities was that, in a continuation 
of colonial practice, they would be governed by religious law insofar as issues of 
personal law (marriage, divorce, adoption, and inheritance) were concerned. In 
1985, the Supreme Court, in adjudicating an apparent con! ict between Muslim 
personal law and the secular Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) on the issue of 
payment of maintenance (spousal support) by a Muslim man to his divorced 
wife, ruled that the provisions of the CrPC applied to all citizens irrespective of 
religion.68 " e Court also took it upon itself to o# er an interpretation of Muslim 
law that resolved the apparent con! ict between the two sets of laws.69 " is latter 
step was perceived by the (mostly male) leaders of the Muslim community as an 
infringement of their religious freedom and provoked widespread agitation. In 
response, the Congress government of Rajiv Gandhi passed ! e Muslim Women 
(Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986,67 overriding the judgment and exempting 
Muslims from the ambit of the relevant provision of the CrPC. " is was attacked 
by the entire spectrum of political opposition and by women’s groups as an 
assault on secularism as well as on the rights of Muslim women, who were seen 
as having been deprived of the protection of the CrPC insofar as spousal support 
was concerned.6( 
Intriguingly, in the ensuing parliamentary debate, secularism was invoked both 
in legitimation of, and in opposition to, the bill.8# Ironically, opposition invocations 
of secularism echoed the Congress’s own understanding of the concept in the 
Constituent Assembly debates.8$ In contrast, the Congress’s conception of 
secularism had shifted from one entailing the exclusion of religion from politics 
to one of equal respect for all religions.8" Moreover, the Congress additionally 
argued that minorities were entitled to a special degree of forbearance from the 
state insofar as their religious life was concerned (and were also entitled to de$ ne 
the scope of religion). Reform of personal law, if it were ever to take place, had 
to be initiated by minority communities themselves rather than at the behest of 
the state. Contrasted with the Indian state’s extensive reformation of Hindu law 
in the 1950s, this argument was e# ectively a damning admission that the state 
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could only legitimately claim to represent and act for Hindus.-. ! e recasting 
of secularism in these terms was supported by shifts in understandings of 
democracy as the representation of groups (rather than individuals) by members 
of those groups. National unity was still central in the legitimating vocabulary 
of group rights, but its requirements were construed very di" erently: while the 
recognition of religious di" erences had been considered antithetical to national 
unity in the Constituent Assembly debates, such recognition was now considered 
necessary towards the same end. Bajpai suggests that this shift betrayed a more 
pessimistic reading of the state’s capacity to reshape society than had prevailed 
in the heady days of the 1940s and 50s.-/ Finally, the recasting of secularism as 
religious freedom for groups was given a venerable genealogy by linking secularism 
to putative ancient Hindu practices of accommodation as well as traditions 
of cultural diversity that had prevailed in the subcontinent since antiquity. In 
making arguments of this sort, even as it purported to act in defence of Muslim 
religious freedom, the Congress was e" ectively widening the ideological space 
for Hindu nationalism—a move that its ideological opponents in the BJP would 
exploit to maximum e" ect over the next two decades.-*
By the late 1970s, the Indian political landscape was being reshaped by the 
emergence of an alliance of lower caste parties that were beginning to make the 
case for an extension of caste-based quotas in government employment and 
institutions of higher education to “Other Backward Classes” (OBCs—a residual 
category of castes sandwiched between those considered upper caste and the 
Scheduled Castes). ! ese arguments came to a head in 1990 in the debate 
surrounding the implementation of the Mandal Report, in which Prime Minister 
V. P. Singh of the Janata Dal-led National Front coalition-- recommended employment 
and higher education quotas of 27 per cent for OBCs. Crucially, Bajpai argues 
that social justice and democracy occupied relatively more important positions 
in the legitimating vocabulary deployed to argue for OBC quotas, with national 
unity declining in rhetorical priority.-0 ! is change was supported by shifting 
conceptions of equality and democracy. While earlier elaborations of equality—
heavily informed by the imperatives of national unity—had understood it as 
meaning non-discrimination between (i.e., identical treatment of ) individuals, 
with quotas seen as detracting from fairness to individuals, later interpretations 
viewed it as requiring fair and equal opportunity, which could sometimes entail 
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treating di! erently situated agents dissimilarly.78 Conceptions of democracy were 
increasingly linked to social justice, shifting from earlier, largely proceduralist 
notions, to more participatory ones that took equality of outcomes more seriously. 
Finally, the emphasis placed on empowering the oppressed by installing them in 
positions of power as both a goal and a mechanism of social justice meant that 
the discourse on OBC quotas was much less paternalistic than the analogous 
debate at the time of the drafting of the Constitution.7( 
" e shifting place of national unity in the legitimating vocabulary of group 
rights suggests that the intensity of cartographic anxiety has varied with time; yet 
the variation has not been one of inexorable decline. Bajpai argues that in the 
discourse of national parties such as the Congress and the BJP, social justice 
continued to be seen as a means to the end of national unity. In contrast, the 
discourse of the Janata Dal (JD) and other lower-caste parties treated social 
justice as an end in itself.9# Indeed, when opposition parties pointed out that the 
JD policy had triggered strife and instability, the JD responded that national 
unity might temporarily have to be overridden in the interests of social justice.9$ 
What is interesting about this observation is that it suggests that cartographic 
anxiety was distributed unevenly amongst the political classes, being felt more 
acutely by those parties portraying themselves as having an all-India base and less 
so by parties de# ning themselves more narrowly as representative of particular 
castes: To be national is to be anxious about a very particular kind of cartography. 
Among the many implications that Bajpai draws out of her analysis of the 
conceptual shifts in arguments for OBC quotas is the observation that the third 
front9" ideological space has endured despite its political party fragmentation, 
resisting absorption by either the Congress or the BJP precisely because the 
imperative of national unity—so central to both those parties—occupies a much 
more peripheral place in its philosophy. Yet, the downside of the failure to 
construe social justice arguments as consonant with national unity and with a 
vision of the common good is that a$  rmative action for OBCs remains vulnerable 
to the charge that it is simply an opportunistic cultivation of “vote banks” rather 
than a requirement of compensatory justice that is in the national interest.9: 
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As with the other books reviewed here, Bajpai’s work will speak to readers 
with no particular interest in group rights in India. ! roughout, Bajpai writes in 
" rm opposition to postcolonial and Marxist dismissals of liberalism; by unpacking the 
ideological macro-unit that is liberalism into its conceptual elements, she reveals 
it to be far more capacious and malleable than its critics’ rather monolithic 
renderings of it sometimes suggest. Liberalism, in her account, has been 
both hostile to and accommodating of group rights depending on how its 
conceptual components have been arranged relative to one another. Another general 
theme running through Bajpai’s book is an irritation with what she describes 
as critical theory’s  “neo-orientalist fascination with ‘indigenous’ social forms 
of religion, caste, and tribe” and consequent neglect of the extent to which 
putatively Western liberal and democratic norms have taken root in everyday 
Indian political discourse, well outside the social worlds of the urban elite.-. 
Summarizing her argument, the author emphasizes that shifts in the trajectories 
of group rights discourse have all taken place within the context of an enduring 
legitimati ng vocabulary that has been predominantly liberal and democratic. ! e 
increasing prominence of religion and caste in Indian political discourse, far from 
repudiating liberal principles, has occurred in ways that use the normative and 
institutional resources of liberal democracy and a modernist vocabulary of rights 
and justice.-* In her view, these shifts occur not so much through the importation 
of vernacular values as via a rearrangement of concepts in the core legitimating 
vocabulary around which the system is structured. 
I am not sure that the vernacular/Western distinction that Bajpai references 
in this rather bland summation does justice to what is in fact an extremely rich 
and subtle book. ! ere are a number of junctures at which Bajpai illustrates the 
formation of an overlapping consensus on liberal democratic values through the 
convergence of ideologically disparate strands of political opinion—for instance, 
the opposition to political safeguards for minorities and the convergent usage 
of a modernist vocabulary of secularism by both Hindu nationalists and liberal 
modernists for utterly di# erent reasons,-/ or the use of Hindu beliefs regarding 
the need to pay for the sins of one’s ancestors in arguments about the justi" ability 
of a$  rmative action to remedy the historical injustice of caste discrimination.-- 
To cite these articulations of indigenous beliefs in political discourse and their 
occasional dressing up in liberal democratic clothing is not quite to say, as Ashis 
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Nandy would, that non-modern values, concepts, and beliefs are better at 
getting us to the professed goals of a modernity.78 It is to say, rather, that the 
capaciousness of liberal democratic concepts allows them to function as 
placeholders for non-liberal, even illiberal, norms. ! is is of course a double-edged 
potentiality, for it can both enable the accommodation of di" erence and clear 
space for the operation of illiberal and intolerant values—indeed, both of these 
possibilities are visible in this book.
! e trajectories of Indian citizenship outlined in these books suggest that 
there is no end to cartographic anxiety. Perhaps this is not surprising. If the 
boundaries that constitute states are social institutions, they must continually be 
reproduced by processes in which all states will remain heavily invested. But there 
is something about the Indian trajectories reviewed here that suggests a qualitative 
transformation in the nature of the anxiety underpinning these processes of 
cartographic reproduction: ! e neurosis of the not-yet-nation has become that of 
a not-yet-superpower. ! e historic shift from a foreign policy of non-alignment 
to one of alliance with the world’s only superpower has brought opportunities, 
but also new threats.7( Not coincidentally, old animosities against the internal 
and external Muslim Other have acquired paranoid global proportions, re# ected 
in the reframing of the Bangladeshi migrant ‘threat.’ As shown by the Naxalite 
insurgency, seismic shifts in economic policy have exacerbated tensions around 
land acquisition and resource exploitation, yet the imperative of maintaining the 
high growth rates be$ tting an emerging power frequently trumps competing 
considerations of equity. With growing power comes a growing ambition 
to showcase oneself to the world. ! e curiously mixed collective paroxysm 
of self-aggrandizement and self-doubt that surrounded India’s hosting of the 
Commonwealth Games in 2010 may be a sign of things to come. Only the 
Olympics will do now: bigger, better, and more stressful. As for the Customs 
Department, its o%  cials no longer patiently stamp the pages of o" ending atlases. 
On occasion, they obliterate maps by pasting slips of paper over them, as ! e 
Economist discovered to its detriment in 2011.8# In a nuclear age, cartographic 
anxiety has also, in a manner of speaking, gone ballistic.
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